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Abstract—Mechanism design for a social utility being the sum
of agents’ utilities (SoU) is a well-studied problem. There are,
however, a number of problems of theoretical and practical
interest where a designer may have a different objective than
maximization of the SoU. One motivation for this is the
desire for more equitable allocation of resources among agents.
A second, more subtle, motivation is the fact that a fairer
allocation indirectly implies less variation in taxes which can
be desirable in a situation where (implicit) individual agent
budgetary constraints make payment of large taxes unrealistic.
In this paper we study a family of social utilities that provide fair
allocation (with SoU being subsumed as an extreme case) and
derive conditions under which Bayesian and Dominant strategy
implementation is possible. Furthermore, it is shown how a
simple modification of the above mechanism can guarantee full
Bayesian implementation. Through a numerical example it is
shown that the proposed method can result in significant gains
both in allocation fairness and tax reduction.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mechanism design is a well-established framework for
dealing with decentralized resource allocation problems in
the presence of strategic agents. The corresponding literature
is vast, especially in the domain of Dominant, Nash and
Bayesian implementation, [1], [2], [3], [4]. In the area of
Engineering–and in particular in the area of Networks– a
majority of the works start with the assumption that the social
objective is the sum of individual utilities (SoU) of all the
system’s agents.
There are strong mathematical reasons for preferring SoU
as the resource allocation objective. The main one being that
for SoU, in conjunction with quasi-linear utilities, agents’
individual goals can be aligned directly with the overall
social objective, so that when agents maximize their net
utility they are simultaneously maximizing the overall social
objective. The VCG mechanism [5] is the most prominent
example of this. With social objective
∑N
i=1 v(xˆ(θ); θi)
and individual utility of v(xˆ(φ); θi) − ti(φ), VCG taxes
ti(φ) = −
∑
j 6=i v(xˆ(φ);φj) +fi(φ−i) precisely ask the user
to perform social objective maximization whilst maximizing
self utility.
There are, however, a number of problems of theoretical
and practical interest where a designer may have a different
objective than maximization of the SoU. One obvious reason
for such a preference is the desire of the social planner to
introduce fairness in the allocation process. Consider for
example, a network where optimizing SoU results in one (or
a few) agents receiving almost all the available resources
and everyone else receiving an appreciably lower portion. In
instances of this kind, appealing to fairness or equality, a
system designer may genuinely want allocations which are
more equitable, even if this may come at the cost of reduced
revenue.
A second–more subtle–reason for wanting a different social
objective is the fact that the standard mechanism design
framework does not provide any formal way of limiting the
range of the taxes/subsidies required at equilibrium. This
implies that when strong budget balance is imposed on
the mechanism, the magnitude of the monetary transfers
(taxes/subsidies) can vary greatly among agents (with those
who benefit more from the allocation having to contribute
more as well). This can be a significant practical problem
since it does not take into account the budget constraints of
individual agents. The work of [6] is attacking this problem
by considering the dual version of the resource allocation
problem and putting additional structure on the dual variables
to ensure less variation between them. This would typically
ensure less fluctuation in prices (and thus in the monetary
transfers) since it is well-known that the dual variables for
resource allocation optimization problems act as prices in the
corresponding markets. A modified social objective provides
an alternative way for dealing with the issue of large tax
variation. By making the social objective a more concave
function of the utilities (compared to the SoU) a smaller
variation of the taxes is expected.
As soon as one moves away from the SoU objective, due
to the social and individual objectives not aligning with
each other, basic design techniques like VCG mechanism
are not useful. This is one of the main reasons why there are
significantly fewer results on fairness in the mechanism design
literature. In [7], authors use the concept of “proportional
fairness” (similar to the sum of log of utilities) to reduce
disparity. The focus is on a tax-less mechanism where the
contract proposes to throw away existing resources (“resource-
burning”) in order to tax untruthful agents. This mechanism
achieves at least 1e fraction of proportionally fair allocation.
In [8], optimal auctions in the Bayesian set up are derived,
such that instead of efficiency maximization or revenue
maximization, a linearly combined metric is maximized which
favors exchange of goods at low prices (thereby ensuring fairer
trade). “Envy-freeness” is another well-known criterion for
equitable allocations (see [9]). This notion was originally
proposed for exchange economies where an allocation is
called envy-free if no agent is strictly better off by taking
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someone else’s allocation instead of their own1. Such a
notion was argued in terms of the stability it provides, since
each agent may be content with what they have comparing
to the possible option of acquiring someone else’s allocation.
This, however, is an ex-post notion and in general imposes
quite stringent constraints on the design. For a large enough
environment it may indeed be impossible to achieve envy-
freeness in optimal allocation.
It is interesting to note that the problem of mechanism
design for risk-averse agents (see for e.g., [10], [11]) is in
some respects the opposite problem of the one addressed
here. In that case, the social planner’s objective is relatively
more “aggressive” compared to the more risk averse individual
objectives.
In this paper, we ask if and how we can design mechanisms
that implement social objectives that are especially designed
for fairness and go beyond the standard paradigm of SoU. We
seek a methodology that is flexible enough to create space
for the designer when envy-freeness may not be feasible.
We concentrate on the form of the social objective given by
the additive function
∑N
i=1 g(v(x; θi)) where v(x; θi) is the
utility of the i-th user with allocation x and type θi. Here
we take g(z) = z − f(z) as a family of concave functions
parameterized by  > 0, with f(·) an arbitrary convex function.
In this setup, the SoU is a special case with  = 0, while as the
parameter  increases, more fairness is built into the allocation.
The form g(z) = z− f(z) is considered without significant
loss of generality, since it closely emulates Taylor’s series
(w.r.t. ) of many interesting families of concave functions.
Consider for example the family h(z) = z1−, the Taylor’s
series for this family is h(z) = z−(z log(z))+o(), where
z log(z) is indeed convex. Note that unlike agents’ utilities,
the choice of the specific function g is in the designer’s hand,
as long as it serves the design objective of fairer allocation.
Furthermore, in Section VII we discuss how the results are still
valid even when f(z) depends on  (under certain conditions).
Within this framework we ask for which values of the
parameter  and under what conditions for the convex function
f(·) is Dominant strategy implementation possible and when
is Bayesian Nash Equilbrium (BNE) implementation possible.
We show that indeed mechanism design is possible provided
 is not too large, by providing an upper bound on the range
of . This is done by formulating the incentive compatibility
constraints as a set of linear inequalities on the design
variables and checking whether this system (together with
strong budget balance and/or individual rationality) is feasible.
Our proving techniques follow closely the work of [12], [13].
Not surprisingly, the results in the Bayesian set-up are derived
under certain assumptions on the prior beliefs, pi(θ−i|θi),
of agents, which are trivially satisfied for the case where
pi(θ−i|θi) = pi(θ−i).
For the case of Bayesian mechanism design, we also
propose a modification to our mechanism which ensures not
only that truth-telling is a BNE but also that it is the only
BNE. This modification doesn’t make significant changes to
1Note that this exchange refers to both allocation of good and taxes.
the mechanism and only requires exchange of one additional
message.
We finally demonstrate (through a numerical example) that
the range of  is sufficient to provide quite significant gains
in fairness - as measured by the decrease in Gini Coefficient
of the utilities. In addition, and this relates to the second
reason we mentioned above regarding our motivation for this
work, the results show a significant decrease in the variance
of required taxes to achieve incentive compatibility.
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II defines the Centralized problem which has been
modified for fairness. The next two sections prove the
existence of mechanisms that implement the aforementioned
social objectives for type sets of size two in Dominant
strategy (Section III) and for general type sets in BNE
(Section IV). Section V presents the modification for full
Bayesian implementation. The numerical example is presented
in Section VI. Finally, Section VII discusses future work and
immediate extensions of the results in here.
II. CENTRALIZED PROBLEM
For a system of agentsN = {1, . . . , N}, efficient allocation
is calculated via the following optimization problem:
xˆ(θ) = arg max
x∈X
∑
i∈N
g(v(x; θi)), (1)
where X ⊂ RN+ is the constraint set, θ = (θi)i∈N ∈ Θ ,
×i∈NΘi is the type profile of agents and Θi is the discrete
type set for agent i with |Θi| = Li. The utility function
v(x; θi) measures agent’s i satisfaction at allocation x with
private type being θi. A concave transformation g(·) is
applied for making the allocation fairer compared to the SoU
setup. It is further assumed that the functions g : R → R
and v(·; θi) : RN+ → R are such that the optimization has a
unique solution (e.g., if v(·; θi) is concave and g is concave
and increasing and X is a convex set). Specifically the form
g(z) = z − f(z) for  ≥ 0 is considered here, where f(·)
is assumed to be a bounded convex function. Note that at
 = 0 optimization (1) becomes the SoU problem, while as
 increases from 0 the function g has a stronger concave
component.
Define, ∀ i ∈ N , Fi := {(ψi, ξi) ∈ Θ2i | ψi 6= ξi}. With
this we define the difference, ∀ i ∈ N , (θi, φi) ∈ Fi, θ−i ∈
Θ−i,  > 0,
Ki(θi, φi, θ−i, ) :=
∑
j∈N
g(v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θj))
−
∑
j∈N
g(v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θj)). (2)
Optimality conditions from (1) give that the above difference
is always non-negative. However, due to the finite type spaces,
the difference above is expected to be strictly positive. We
make appropriate assumptions in this regard later.
III. DOMINANT STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION
The Mechanism Design problem in this section is to find a
message space M = ×i∈NMi and allocation, tax functions
(x˜, t) :M→ X ×RN such that the induced game for agents
in N with action space M and quasi-linear utilities
u˜i(m; θi) = v(x˜(m); θi)− ti(m) ∀ m ∈M, i ∈ N (3)
has a dominant strategy equilibrium2 m? for which x˜(m?) =
xˆ(θ), where θ = (θi)i∈N is the true type profile. This is
known as Dominant Strategy Incentive Compatibility (DSIC).
In general, Dominant strategy implementation is very
restrictive (note that the well studied VCG mechanisms are no
longer applicable since this is not the maximization of SoU).
Following [14], the special case of Li = 2 ∀ i ∈ N is consid-
ered in this section. In particular, Θi = {θHi , θLi } ∀ i ∈ N .
The proposed mechanism is a direct mechanism, thusMi =
Θi ∀ i ∈ N . Agents report their types (possibly untruthfully)
φ = (φi)i∈N and the allocation they receive on the basis of
this is the optimal allocation xˆ(φ) for the quoted type profile
φ, where xˆ(·) is defined in (1).
Assuming that for not participating in the mechanism, an
agent receives 0 utility value (including 0 tax), the voluntary
participation condition for Dominant strategy implementation
is ∀ (θi, θ−i) ∈ Θ, i ∈ N ,
v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θi)− ti(θi, θ−i) ≥ 0. (4)
This is the ex-post version of the individual rationality (IR).
The first contribution of this paper is summarized in the
following Theorem.
Theorem III.1. For any  ≥ 0, there exist taxes(
ti(φ)
)
φ∈Θ,i∈N that satisfy the corresponding DSIC (which
implies implementation in Dominant strategies) and IR
conditions if and only if, ∀ θ−i ∈ Θ−i, i ∈ N ,
v(xˆ(θ
H
i , θ−i); θ
H
i ) + v(xˆ(θ
L
i , θ−i); θ
L
i )
− v(xˆ(θHi , θ−i); θLi )− v(xˆ(θLi , θ−i); θHi ) ≥ 0. (5)
Proof: Please see Appendix A.
Next we state the assumption on (1) under which the next
result in this section is derived.
Condition (AD): Assume that ∃ max > 0 such that for
all 0 ≤  < max, ∀ i ∈ N , (θi, φi) ∈ Fi, θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
Ki(θi, φi, θ−i, ) +Ki(φi, θi, θ−i, ) > 0. (6)
Condition (AD) and the ones below in Corollary III.3, IV.2,
IV.3 and Condition (AB) can be checked only at  = 0. By
continuity of the optimization on parameter , this will imply
that these conditions continue to hold for all 0 ≤  < max
for some max > 0.
Theorem III.2. If Condition (AD) is satisfied then ∃ ˜max >
0 such that for all 0 ≤  < ˜max there exist taxes(
ti(φ)
)
φ∈Θ,i∈N that satisfy DSIC (which implies implemen-
tation in Dominant strategies) and IR.
2For any θ, message m? ∈ M is a dominant strategy equilibrium if it
satisfies u˜i(m?i ,m−i; θi) ≥ u˜i(mi,m−i; θi) ∀ mi ∈ Mi, ∀ m−i ∈M−i, ∀ i ∈ N .
Remark. The relation between max and ˜max is defined in
the proof, specifically via the relation in (27).
Proof: Please see Appendix B.
Stated below is a corollary to the above result, which uses
a stricter condition.
Corollary III.3. If ∃ max > 0 such that for all 0 ≤  <
max,
min
i∈N
min
(θi,φi)∈Fi
min
θ−i∈Θ−i
Ki(θi, φi, θ−i, ) > 0, (7)
then ∃ ˜max > 0 such that for all 0 ≤  < ˜max there exist
taxes that satisfy DSIC and IR.
Proof: As (7) implies (6), the Corollary follows from
Theorem III.2. Also, as long as the above assumption holds,
the value of ˜max will be same as the one derived in the
previous proof, since it is only defined by the expression
in (27).
IV. BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION
In this section the type sets are of arbitrary size. Dominant
strategy implementation is too restrictive for the general
scenario, hence the next best reasonable solution concept
- Bayesian implementation, is considered.
In a Bayesian set up, agents have a prior distribution on
the type profile. For agent i, prior is pi ∈ ∆(Θ). For basic
regularity assume that the prior gives non-zero probability
on all points of Θ (this is only a technical condition and the
ensuing results can be proved without it as well). These priors
are assumed to be common knowledge between agents and
designer - hence there is no need to introduce second order
beliefs over the priors and so on.
The mechanism used here is a direct mechanism with
allocation function xˆ(·) (same as before). Given the allocation
and tax functions (xˆ, t) : Θ→ X×RN , the utility function in
the Bayesian set up for strategy profile {σj : Θj → Θj}j∈N
is given by, ∀ i ∈ N ,
u˜i(σ | θi) = Epi(·|θi)
[
v
(
xˆ(σ(θ)); θi
)− ti(σ(θ))]. (8)
where θi is the true type of agent i. The Bayesian implemen-
tation condition–also known as Bayesian Strategy Incentive
Compatibility (BSIC)–for the direct mechanism is that the
truthful strategy σ?i (θi) = θi, ∀ θi ∈ Θi, ∀ i ∈ N must be a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE)3 for the induced Bayesian
game.
In addition, it is required the tax function to have the Strong
Budget Balance (SBB) property, i.e.,∑
i∈N
ti(ψ) = 0, ∀ ψ ∈ Θ. (9)
We restrict attention to optimization (1) and priors
{pi(·)}i∈N that satisfy the following conditions.
3Strategy σ? =
(
σ?i : Θi → Θi
)
i∈N is a BNE if ∀i ∈ N , ∀ θi ∈
Θi, ∀ σ′i : Θi → Θi; u˜i(σ?i , σ?−i | θi) ≥ u˜i(σ′i, σ?−i | θi).
Condition (AB): Assume that ∃ max > 0 such that
H() > 0 for all 0 ≤  < max, where
H() := min
i∈N
min
(θi,φi)∈Fi
Epi(·|θi)
[
hi(θi, φi, θ−i, )
]
, (10a)
hi(θi, φi, θ−i, ) :=∑
j∈N
(
v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θj)− v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θj)
)
. (10b)
This is the most general form of the assumption needed
about the optimization here; after proving Theorem IV.1,
corollaries are stated with stricter assumptions than above.
Condition (B): Assume that for any non-zero vector
R := (R(ψ))ψ∈Θ with R(ψ) ∈ R, there does not exist any
λ := (λk(θk, φk))k∈N ,(θk,φk)∈Fk with λk(θk, φk) ∈ R+ such
that ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ ψ ∈ Θ,
pi(ψ−i | ψi)
∑
φi∈Θi
φi 6=ψi
λi(φi, ψi)−
∑
θi∈Θi
θi 6=ψi
pi(ψ−i | θi)λi(θi, ψi)
= R(ψ). (11)
This condition was first introduced in [14] and subsumes
the case of conditionally independent priors, i.e., pj(ψ−j |
ψj) = pj(ψ−j) (refer to [14] for an example of priors which
are not conditionally independent but still satisfy the condition
above).
The second contribution of this paper is summarized in the
following Theorem.
Theorem IV.1. If Conditions (AB) and (B) are satisfied then
for all 0 ≤  < max, there exist taxes
(
ti(φ)
)
φ∈Θ,i∈N that
satisfy BSIC (which implies implementation in BNE) and SBB.
Proof: Please see Appendix C.
Stated below are corollaries which successively use stricter
conditions.
Corollary IV.2. If ∃ max > 0 such that for all 0 ≤  <
max,
min
i∈N
min
(θi,φi)∈Fi
min
θ−i∈Θ−i
hi(θi, φi, θ−i, ) > 0 (12)
and Condition (B) is satisfies then for all 0 ≤  < max there
exist taxes which satisfy BSIC and SBB.
Corollary IV.3. If ∃ max > 0 such that for all 0 ≤  < max,
and ∀ i ∈ N , (θi, φi) ∈ Fi, θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
K() +  gi(θi, φi, θ−i, ) > 0, (13a)
where K() := min
i∈N
min
(θi,φi)∈Fi
min
θ−i∈Θ−i
Ki(θi, φi, θ−i, ),
(13b)
gi(θi, φi, θ−i, )
:=
∑
j∈N
f(v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θj))− f(v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θj)) (13c)
and Condition (B) is satisfied then for all 0 ≤  < max there
exist taxes which satisfy BSIC and SBB.
Since (13a) ⇒ (12) ⇒ Condition (AB), hence these
Corollaries follow from Theorem IV.1.
V. FULL BAYESIAN IMPLEMENTATION
In accordance with the majority of the literature on Bayesian
implementation (see for e.g. [15], [16], [3], [17]), the main
result in the previous section aimed at BSIC condition for
implementation. This ensures that truth-telling is a BNE but
gives no information about other possible BNE. In general
this might be a problem, since when the Bayesian game is
played, the designer cannot predict in advance which BNE
will be achieved. The justification used in such a situation is
that of “focusing”4. Along with the mechanism, the selected
BNE is also announced by the designer. All the agents are
then focused towards this particular BNE and in anticipation
that others will be playing according to it, they too choose
to play it.
In this section we modify our mechanism by augmenting
each agents’ message space to include one additional message
- which takes values in a continuous space - with the specific
aim of achieving full implementation i.e. truth-telling as the
only BNE. This will add to the robustness of the mechanism
and will put to rest any equilibrium selection issues. Such a
modification only requires that the BSIC constraints (see (30))
can be satisfied with strict inequality. This gives the designer
room to alter taxes.
For general Bayesian mechanism design, authors in [18]
have derived sufficient conditions under which augmenting
the message space results in full implementation. However a
specific mechanism is not derived.
To keep analysis straightforward we make the next assump-
tions.
Assumption V.1. Assume private consumption i.e. any agent
i’s utility is affected only by level of his/her consumption xi.
Assumption V.2. Assume that v(xi, θi) is strictly concave and
is differentiable w.r.t. xi at all values of xi, θi.
Extending to general public goods is possible, but will make
the proofs more technical and obfuscate the basic idea behind
them. Differentiability of the utility function is essential to
get an explicit modification.
The new message space, allocation and taxes for any agent
i are
Mi = Θi × [−δ,+δ], mi = (φi, yi). (14a)
x˜,i(m) = xˆ,i(φ) + yi, (14b)
t˜i(m) =
{
tˆi(φ) + yiv
′(xˆ,i(φ);φi). if y ∈ (−δ,+δ),
B if y = ±δ.
(14c)
where xˆ(φ) is the allocation from (1) and tˆi(φ) is a tax
designed for BSIC and SBB (from the previous section). Also,
δ,B > 0 are constants chosen by the designer. Here δ will
be a small constant and how it is chosen will be clear in the
proof of Theorem V.3. The constant B is chosen to be large
enough so that no rational agent will ever choose message
yi = ±δ. This is possible because due to the type sets being
discrete, the utilities are bounded. The modification above
4This is the same justification as the one used for working without loss
of generality, with the Revelation principle and direct mechanisms.
allows agents to change their allocation by a small amount
yi ∈ [−δ,+δ]. For this increase/decrease in allocation they
are charged/subsidized at the “market” price v′(xˆ,i(φ);φi)
corresponding to the truth-telling strategy. This modification
serves the purpose of giving agents more delicate control of
their allocation and utility than in a discrete set-up. Technically,
this allows the designer to disrupt any BNE at which the price
an agent is capable of paying (i.e. his/her derivative without
tax terms) doesn’t match the market price designed for truthful
strategies.
Theorem V.3. Assuming there exists taxes that satisfy BSIC
constraints (see for instance (30a)) with strict inequality, for
the mechanism defined in (14) at any true type profile θ =
(θi)i∈N ,
(1) message m? = (θ, 0) is a BNE.
Furthermore, assuming ∀ i ∈ N , (θi, φi) ∈ Fi, the sign of the
quantity v′(xˆ,i(φi, φ−i); θi)− v′(xˆ,i(φi, φ−i);φi) remains
same ∀ φ−i ∈ Θ−i,
(2) any message other than m? isn’t a BNE.
Hence the mechanism in (14) achieves full Bayesian imple-
mentation.
Proof: Please see Appendices E and F.
The no-crossing condition above gives a more definite
meaning to private types. In SoU or related problems like
here (1), the level of allocation is determined more by the
rate of growth of utilities than the value. This is because at
optimum, trade-offs between giving infinitesimal allocation to
one agent vs. another will be determined by the slope of their
utilities at those points. Thus by the above condition, one can
implicitly order types - from the one providing smallest slope
to the highest.
A stronger assumption (than above) that works is that the
sign of the quantity v′(xi; θi) − v′(xi;φi) is same ∀ xi ∈
Proj.(X ) (projection onto the i−th dimension). This might
be useful in some cases since verifying this only requires
utility functions and type sets whereas  and the optimization
solution aren’t required.
The above assumptions are in fact two of many that can be
made to get the result. The proof of Part (2) of Theorem V.3
requires the quantity∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)
[
v′(xˆi(σ(θ)); θi)−v′(xˆi(σ(θ));σi(θi))
]
(15)
to remain non-zero whenever σi(θi) 6= θi. In general, any
condition that ensures that for any non-truthful strategy σ there
exist an agent i and type θi for which the above expression
is non-zero, would do as well. For example, given type
sets, utilities and the optimization, a condition on the priors
might thus be sufficient. Furthermore, such condition wouldn’t
significantly reduce the set of possible priors since it only
requires few equations to remain non-zero.
Finally, the mechanism presented here has SBB property
only at BNE. However, as in proof of Theorem IV.1, using
the d’AGV form for budget balanced taxes i.e. t˜i(m) =
z˜i(m)− 1N−1
∑
j 6=i z˜j(m) a straightforward modification can
make the mechanism in (14) budget balanced off-equilibrium
as well.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS / EXAMPLES
This section contains numerical examples which have been
evaluated to ascertain the scope of application of the existence
results provided in the previous sections. In particular we
are interested in evaluating the gain in overall fairness w.r.t.
allocation and taxes, attained with the proposed method.
Consider Θi = S , {θH , θL} ∀ i ∈ N , where θH > θL
and utilities are quadratic with private consumption i.e. ∀ i ∈
N , ∀ θi ∈ S, ∀ x ∈ RN+ ,
v(x; θi) := 2θixi − θix2i . (16)
The constraint set is X = {x ∈ RN+ |
∑
i xi = 1} and
g(z) = z − z2. Thus the Centralized optimization problem
is
xˆ(θ) = arg max
x∈X
∑
i∈N
(
2θixi − θix2i
)−  (2θixi − θix2i )2 .
(17)
We consider the well known Gini coefficient (GC)5 as a
measure of disparity in allocation. At  = 0 the objective is
exactly the SoU. As  starts increasing from 0 onwards, the
optimization problem is transformed such that higher utilities
will be weighed less than lower ones - thereby giving closer
to equal distribution of allocation.
For the numerical analysis we consider Bayesian implemen-
tation (although Dominant implementation is also possible
in this two-type set up) with θH = 1, θL = 0.75 and two
cases N = 10, 90 and vary . Figures 1, 2 depict the GC
of the utility at optimal allocation, {v(xˆ,i(θ), θi)}i∈N at
N = 10 and N = 90, respectively. This is done for various
type profiles, which due to symmetry can be defined by
the number, m ∈ {0, 1, . . . , N}, of agents with type θH .
Also included in the plots is the mean GC where m is
chosen with Binomial(N ,0.5) distribution for N = 10 and
Binomial(N ,0.1) for N = 90. Note that in both cases there
is a potential for large gains in fairness, as long as a large
enough  exists, at which implementation is possible.
In general there are two sources of upper bound on .
One is through the max defined in Condition (AB) and
other is through the well-defined-ness of the optimization
problem (17). For  < 1
2θH
= 0.5, optimization (17) is
a convex optimization problem and hence has a unique
optimizer. One can verify however that the optimization
continues to have a unique optimizer even beyond 0.5 and for
all values of  within the range depicted in Fig. 1, 2. Therefore
we only need to look at Condition (AB). For N = 10,
Condition (AB) gives max ≈ 1.504 and for N = 90 we
get max > 5. With this we limit our plots to  ≤ 1.5 for
N = 10 and  ≤ 5 for N = 90.
5Defined as the ratio of mean of the difference between every possible
pair of data points with mean size. The lower the value of GC, the more
equitable the allocation. GC of 0 is perfectly fair and GC of 1 is absolutely
unfair - everyone except an individual receiving 0. GC is independent of
scale, hence can also be used in comparing fairness across different settings.
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Fig. 1. Gini Coefficient of {v(xˆ(θ); θi)}i∈N vs , N = 10.
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Fig. 2. Gini Coefficient of {v(xˆ(θ); θi)}i∈N vs , N = 90.
In the figures we see that the mean GC can be reduced
by 42 and 80 percentage points for N = 10 and N = 90,
respectively.
Finally, Figures 3, 4 depict the standard deviation in the
tax vector t(θ) for various type profiles as well as their mean.
Here in each case the tax is chosen such that it minimizes
the average variance within the feasible space of taxes, as
dictated by the BSIC constraints. As  increases, for N = 10
the standard deviation in taxes paid can be driven from 0.134
to 0.0001 over the range of permissible . As mentioned in the
Introduction, this means that tax fluctuation between various
agents can be made lower, which can prevent a situation
where taxes required to be paid from agents are not within
their means. For N = 90, standard deviation reduces by more
than one order of magnitude, as it goes from 0.046 to 0.0035.
VII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper introduces a concept of fairness in resource
allocation problems pertaining to SoU maximization. The
fairness aspect is adjustable (through the selection of the
0 0.5 1 1.50
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
ε
St
d.
 D
ev
ia
tio
n 
of
 T
ax
 v
ec
to
r
 
 
m=1 m=3 m=5 m=7 m=9 Mean
Fig. 3. Standard Deviation of t(θ) vs , N = 10.
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Fig. 4. Standard Deviation of t(θ) vs , N = 90.
parameter  and function f(·)) in a family of functions, thus
giving a wide variety of criteria that a designer may choose
at their own discretion. The main result in this paper is the
proof of existence of mechanisms that implement the fairer
allocation in Dominant and Bayesian equilibria (in respective
cases). Numerical results indicate that through the proposed
techniques there are significant gains in fairness of allocation,
within the permissible limits of the design method.
Although the form considered here is g(z) = z− f(z), it
is easy to see that the results can be extended to cases where f
depends on ; as long as terms of the form ·f go to 0 as → 0.
Ideally one would like to consider the class of g(z) = z1−,
so as to reconcile with known fair social utilities such as
the geometric mean and min utility. This however may not
be a practical necessity since as indicated by the results
in Section VI, even the form g(z) = z − z2 provides a
significant reduction in GC, as well as the standard deviation
of taxes. Also, as demonstrated in the Introduction, even
theoretically the form g(z) = z − f(z) can be considered
as a close approximation to many other families (including
the one above) using the Taylor’s series.
Finally a modification of our mechanism was presented,
which guarantees truth-telling as the only BNE. This was
done by adding one continuous message per agent, other
than his/her type. This modification is especially useful in
situations where selection of equilibria is too complex to
predict.
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM III.1
Proof: Note that the taxes are a finite collection of
variables, since Θ,N are both finite sets. For the DSIC
constraints to be satisfied, the following constraints must
hold ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
v(xˆ(θ
H
i , θ−i); θ
H
i )− ti(θHi , θ−i)
≥ v(xˆ(θLi , θ−i); θHi )− ti(θLi , θ−i), (18a)
v(xˆ(θ
L
i , θ−i); θ
L
i )− ti(θLi , θ−i)
≥ v(xˆ(θHi , θ−i); θLi )− ti(θHi , θ−i). (18b)
This gives truth-telling as a dominant strategy for agent i
regardless of types of others. For IR, the following constraints
must be satisfied ∀ i ∈ N , ∀ θ−i ∈ Θ−i,
ti(θ
H
i , θ−i) ≤ v(xˆ(θHi , θ−i); θHi ), (19a)
ti(θ
L
i , θ−i) ≤ v(xˆ(θLi , θ−i); θLi ). (19b)
From the above sets of constraints, it is clear that one can
design
(
ti(θ
H
i , θ−i), ti(θ
L
i , θ−i)
)
separately for each i ∈ N ,
θ−i ∈ Θ−i. So for any i, θ−i, the constraints can be rewritten
in the form
1 −1
−1 1
1 0
0 1
[t1t2
]
≤

AHH −ALH
ALL −AHL
AHH
ALL
 (20)
where (t1, t2) =
(
ti(θ
H
i , θ−i), ti(θ
L
i , θ−i)
)
and
AHH = v(xˆ(θ
H
i , θ−i); θ
H
i ), ALL = v(xˆ(θ
L
i , θ−i); θ
L
i ),
AHL = v(xˆ(θ
H
i , θ−i); θ
L
i ), ALH = v(xˆ(θ
L
i , θ−i); θ
H
i ).
(21)
Using the Farkas Lemma, the above system is feasible in
t if and only if ∀ λ ∈ R4+
1 −1
−1 1
1 0
0 1

> 
λ1
λ2
λ3
λ4
 = 0 ⇒

AHH −ALH
ALL −AHL
AHH
ALL

> 
λ1
λ2
λ3
λ4
 ≥ 0.
(22)
The equality constraints on λ give that
λ1 + λ3 = λ2, λ2 + λ4 = λ1
⇒ λ3 + λ4 = 0 ⇒ λ3 = λ4 = 0. (23)
So λ ∈ R4+ can be parametrized as λ = (ξ, ξ, 0, 0)> for ξ ∈
R+. Thus for feasibility, using Farkas Lemma, the condition
that must be satisfied is(
AHH −ALH , ALL −AHL, AHH , ALL
) · (ξ, ξ, 0, 0) ≥ 0
⇔ ξ(AHH +ALL −AHL −ALH) ≥ 0
⇔ AHH +ALL −AHL −ALH ≥ 0. (24)
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM III.2
Proof: From the definition in (2), we have
v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θi)− f
(
v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θi)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θj)− f
(
v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θj)
)
= v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θi)− f
(
v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θi)
)
+
∑
j 6=i
v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θj)− f
(
v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θj)
)
+Ki(θi, φi, θ−i, ). (25)
Using the above twice, first with (θi, φi) = (θH , θL), θ−i =
θ−i and then with (θi, φi) = (θL, θH), θ−i = θ−i, and
adding the two results in (using the notation from proof
of Theorem III.2)
AHH − f(AHH) +ALL − f(ALL)
= Ki(θ
H , θL, θ−i, ) +Ki(θL, θH , θ−i, )
+AHL − f(AHL) +ALH − f(ALH). (26)
This can be rewritten as
⇔ AHH +ALL −AHL −ALH
= Ki(θ
H , θL, θ−i, ) +Ki(θL, θH , θ−i, )
+ 
(
f(AHH) + f(ALL)− f(AHL)− f(ALH)
)
(27)
Thus it is sufficient to prove that the RHS above is non-
negative. Owing to Condition (AD), ∃ max > 0 such that
the sum of the first two terms in RHS is strictly positive for
all 0 ≤  < max and clearly the second term can be made
arbitrarily small in magnitude (by choosing a smaller max).
Hence the condition in (5) is satisfied6 for all 0 ≤  < ˜max.
Here ˜max is bigger or smaller than max depending on
whether f(AHH) +f(ALL)−f(AHL)−f(ALH) is positive
or negative in the range (0, max).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM IV.1
Proof: The utility for any agent i when other agents are
truth-telling is
u˜i(φi | θi) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)·[
v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θi)− ti(φi, θ−i)
]
(28)
where agent i’s true and quoted types are θi, φi ∈ Θi,
respectively. Here we consider taxes in the d’AGV form
ti(ψ) = zi(ψ)− 1
N − 1
∑
j∈N
j 6=i
zj(ψ) ∀ i ∈ N , ψ ∈ Θ. (29)
Taxes in this form always satisfy SBB and any tax function
which satisfies SBB can be written in this form. Therefore
WLOG, the design variables from here onwards will be
{zj(ψ)}j∈N
ψ∈Θ
.
BSIC constraints can be written as: ∀ i ∈ N , (θi, φi) ∈ Fi,
u˜i(θi | θi) ≥ u˜i(φi | θi). (30a)
⇔
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)
[
zi(θi, θ−i)− 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
zj(θi, θ−i)
−zi(φi, θ−i) + 1
N − 1
∑
j 6=i
zj(φi, θ−i)
]
≤
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)
[
v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θi)− v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θi)
]
.
(30b)
So the condition for design of taxes is a linear system of
inequalities and can be written in the form Az ≤ b where the
indexing is as follows
z =
(
zj(ψ)
)
∈ RD1 , b =
(
b(i, θi, φi)
)
∈ RD2 ,
A =
(
A(i, θi, φi | j, ψ)
)
∈ RD2×D1 . (31)
for D1 = N ·
∏N
j=1 Lj and D2 =
∏N
i=1(L
2
i − Li). The rest
of the proof will be to show that this linear system is feasible
in variable z, using the Farkas Lemma7 [19, pg.201].
6Overall the behaviour of Ki(θi, φi, θ−i, ) w.r.t.  will dictate the value
of max, ˜max. This in turn will effect the usefulness of this method, since
a designer might want to ensure certain minimum gains in fairness for which
he/she might want to choose  as large as possible.
7 Relevant version of the Farkas alternative result: The system
x ∈ RN , Ax ≤ b; A ∈ RM×N , b ∈ RM (32)
is feasible iff all solutions λ ∈ RM+ of A>λ = 0 satisfy b>λ ≥ 0.
Consider any λ =
(
λi(θi, φi)
) ∈ Λ , {λk(θk, φk) ∈
R+ | k ∈ N , (θk, φk) ∈ Fk} that satisfies A>λ = 0, i.e.
∀ j ∈ N , ψ ∈ Θ,∑
i∈N
∑
(θi,φi)∈Fi
A(i, θi, φi | j, ψ)λi(θi, φi) = 0
⇔ pj(ψ−j | ψj)
∑
φj 6=ψj
λj(ψj , φj)
−
∑
θj 6=ψj
pj(ψ−j | θj)λj(θj , ψj)
− 1
N − 1
∑
k 6=j
[
pk(ψ−k | ψk)
∑
φk 6=ψk
λk(ψk, φk)
−
∑
θk 6=ψk
pk(ψ−k | θk)λk(θk, ψk)
]
= 0. (33)
Above equation can be rearranged to give that ∀ j ∈ N , ψ ∈
Θ,
pj(ψ−j | ψj)
∑
φj 6=ψj
λj(ψj , φj)
−
∑
θj 6=ψj
pj(ψ−j | θj)λj(θj , ψj)
=
1
N
∑
k∈N
[
pk(ψ−k | ψk)
∑
φk 6=ψk
λk(ψk, φk)
−
∑
θk 6=ψk
pk(ψ−k | θk)λk(θk, ψk)
]
. (34)
Denote the RHS above by R(ψ) - note that it depends only
on ψ and not j.
Lemma C.1. If λ ∈ Λ satisfies (34) then for any j ∈
N , ψj ∈ Θj ,∑
θj∈Θj
θj 6=ψj
λj(θj , ψj) =
∑
φj∈Θj
φj 6=ψj
λj(ψj , φj) (35)
Proof: Please see Appendix D.
With the application of above Lemma, one can rewrite
LHS of (34) to get that ∀ j, ψ,
pj(ψ−j | ψj)
∑
φj 6=ψj
λj(φj , ψj)−
∑
θj 6=ψj
pj(ψ−j | θj)λj(θj , ψj)
= R(ψ) (36)
Condition (B) on priors states that there exist no λ ∈ Λ
such that above holds for a non-zero R. Hence A>λ = 0
implies that R ≡ 0, therefore (by (34)) ∀ j ∈ N , ∀ ψ ∈ Θ,
pj(ψ−j | ψj)
∑
φj 6=ψj
λj(ψj , φj)
=
∑
θj 6=ψj
pj(ψ−j | θj)λj(θj , ψj). (37)
Next we show that for all λ ∈ Λ that satisfy (37) we have
b>λ ≥ 0 i.e.∑
i∈N
∑
(θi,φi)∈Fi
b(i, θi, ψi)λi(θi, φi) ≥ 0 (38a)
⇔
∑
i∈N ,
(θi,φi)∈Fi
λi(θi, φi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)·
[
v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θi)− v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θi)
]
≥ 0. (38b)
Proving this will finish the proof by Farkas Lemma.
For any i, θi, φi, θ−i, denote x = xˆ(θi, θ−i), x˜ =
xˆ(φi, θ−i). Rearranging terms from (2), gives
v(x; θi)− v(x˜; θi) =∑
j∈N
j 6=i
(
v(x˜; θj)−v(x; θj)
)
+
∑
j∈N
(
f(v(x; θi))−f(v(x˜; θi))
)
+Ki(θi, φi, θ−i, ). (39)
Denote the RHS expression in (39) as η = η1 + η2, where
η1 =
∑
j∈N
j 6=i
(
v(x˜; θj)− v(x; θj)
)
,
η2 = 
∑
j∈N
(
f(v(x; θj))−f(v(x˜; θj))
)
+Ki(θi, φi, θ−i, ).
(40)
Now continuing from LHS of (38b),
LHS of (38b) =
∑
i∈N
(θi,φi)∈Fi
λi(θi, φi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)(η1 + η2).
(41)
For any fixed i, consider the summation with only η1 first∑
(θi,φi)∈Fi
λi(θi, φi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)·
∑
j∈N
j 6=i
(
v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θj)− v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θj)
)
=
∑
j∈N
j 6=i
∑
φi∈Θi,
θ−i∈Θ−i
v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θj)
∑
θi 6=φi
pi(θ−i | θi)λi(θi, φi)
−
∑
j∈N
j 6=i
∑
(θi,φi)∈Fi
θ−i∈Θ−i
λi(θi, φi) pi(θ−i | θi) v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θj).
(42)
By (37), the inside summation in the first term is equal to
pi(θ−i | φi)
∑
ψi
λ(φi, ψi). Incorporating this and changing
variables of summation appropriately gives the overall sum-
mation from (42) equal to 0. Now consider the term in RHS
of (41) with η2∑
i∈N
(θi,φi)∈Fi
λi(θi, φi)
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi) · η2. (43)
Rearranging terms in η2, we can write
η2 =
∑
j∈N
(
v(xˆ(θi, θ−i); θj)− v(xˆ(φi, θ−i); θj)
)
. (44)
Therefore by Condition (AB), ∃ max > 0 such that for all
0 ≤  < max, the inside summation in (43) is non-negative
∀ i ∈ N , (θi, φi) ∈ Fi. This finishes the proof by Farkas
Lemma, since the expression in (38a) is now shown to be
non-negative for all positive 0 ≤  < max.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA C.1
Proof: ∑
θj∈Θj
θj 6=ψj
λj(θj , ψj)−
∑
φj∈Θj
φj 6=ψj
λj(ψj , φj) (45a)
=
∑
ψ−j
[
pj(ψ−j | ψj)
∑
θj 6=ψj
λj(θj , ψj)
−
∑
φj 6=ψj
pj(ψ−j | φj)λj(ψj , φj)
]
(45b)
=
∑
ψ−j
R(ψj , ψ−j) (45c)
=
∑
ψ−j
[
pk(ψ−k | ψk)
∑
θk 6=ψk
λk(θk, ψk) (45d)
−
∑
φk 6=ψk
pk(ψ−k | φk)λk(ψk, φk)
]
, k 6= j
= 0. (45e)
Here (45c), (45d) follows by application of (34) and other
equations are just by rearranging summation terms.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PART (1), THEOREM V.3
Proof: For strategy
(σ, ρ) =
{
(σi : Θi → Θi) , (ρi : Θi → [−δ,+δ])
}
i∈N ,
(46)
utility is
ui(σ, ρ | θi) =
∑
θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)
[
v
(
xˆi(σ(θ)) + ρi(θi); θi
)
− tˆi
(
σ(θ)
)− ρi(θi)v′(xˆ,i(σ(θ));σi(θi))] (47)
First in this proof we establish that for any agent i, true type
θi, when other agents use strategy m?−i = (θ−i, 0), strategy
σi(θi) = θi gives higher utility than σi(θi) 6= θi at any value
of ρi(θi). For this start by considering the utility in (47) with
σ−i(θ−i) = θ−i and ρi(θi) = 0,
u˜i(σi(θi) | θi) =
∑
θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)
[
v
(
xˆ,i(σi(θi), θ−i); θi
)
− tˆi
(
σi(θi), θ−i
)]
. (48)
From the result in Section IV, allocation and taxes (xˆ, tˆ)
satisfy BSIC condition. Hence the utility in (48) is maximized
at σi(θi) = θi. The minimum difference between the value
of such an expression at σi(θi) = θi and σi(θi) 6= θi is
strictly positive since the tax function tˆ satisfies BSIC with
strict inequality. Now the utility ui in (47) clearly depends
continuously on ρi(θi), hence by choosing a small enough
range for ρi(θi) (i.e. by choosing a small enough δ) it can be
ensured that even in (47), for σ−i(θ−i) = θ−i, ui is maximzed
at σi(θi) = θi.
Now the only thing that remains to be proven is that
when other agents quote message m?−i and σi(θi) = θi, then
ρi(θi) = 0 is optimal. For agent i and true type θi, the utility
in (47) only depends on ρi through ρi(θi). Optimizing w.r.t.
ρi(θi) (for calculating equilibrium) gives
∂ui
∂ρi(θi)
=
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)
[
v′(xˆ,i(θ) + ρi(θi); θi)
− v′(xˆ,i(θ);σi(θi))
]
= 0. (49)
At equilibrium, the above derivative will have to be zero since
the end points ±δ cannot be maximizers - since they incur
a huge tax B. Also note that since v(xi; θi) is assumed to
be concave in xi (for any θi) the utility ui(σ, ρ|θi) in (47)
is concave in ρi(θi) and thus the condition in (49) is both
necessary and sufficient for optimality w.r.t. ρi(θi).
The expression in (49) is clearly equal to 0 when σi(θi) =
θi and ρi(θi) = 0. Hence applying the above result for all
θi ∈ Θi and i ∈ N gives that m? = (θ, 0) is a BNE.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF PART (2), THEOREM V.3
Proof: Consider the derivative similar to (49) but with
general strategies
∂ui
∂ρi(θi)
=
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)·[
v′(xˆ,i(σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i)) + ρi(θi); θi)
− v′(xˆ,i(σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i));σi(θi))
]
. (50)
This being zero is a necessary at BNE. Now we begin by
considering the same with ρi(θi) = 0,
Ψ =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
pi(θ−i | θi)
[
v′(xˆ,i(σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i)); θi)
− v′(xˆ,i(σi(θi), σ−i(θ−i));σi(θi))
]
. (51)
By the assumption in the theorem statement, for σi(θi) 6= θi,
the term inside the brackets above is either positive for all
θ−i or negative for all θ−i. Hence the expression Ψ cannot
be zero for any i, θi when σi(θi) 6= θi. Since only discrete
variables are involved in the expression Ψ, it means that all
the values that Ψ can take (i.e. ∀ i, θi, σ with σi(θi) 6= θi)
are a discrete set (say, D) of points not containing zero.
The only difference between the expression in (50) and Ψ is
the introduction of the variable ρi(θi) ∈ [−δ,+δ] - on which
the expression in (50) depends continuously. This means that
the set of all values (say, E) taken by ∂ui∂ρi(θi) is the union of
continuous sets centered at the points from set D. Here the
range of the continuous sets around each point in D can be
continuously controlled by changing δ with the sets becoming
a discrete point as δ → 0. Hence it is clear that one can find
δ small enough so that even this new set E doesn’t contain
zero. Once such a δ is chosen it is clear that any strategy σ
for which ∃ i, θi such that σi(θi) 6= θi cannot be a BNE since
the expression in (50) being zero was a necessary condition
for a BNE.
Note that each part of the proof of Theorem V.3 prescribes
a positive upper limit for δ. The designer will eventually
choose a δ that satisfies both.
Now consider a strategy of the form m?i = (θi, yi) where
there is truth-telling but yi 6= 0. It is clear that this cannot be
a BNE, since by strict concavity of v(xi; θi), at σi(θi) = θi
the expression in (50) goes to zero only for ρi(θi) = yi = 0.
